Enterprises today face a constant barrage of security threats stemming from worms, viruses, trojans, and other malware. This is in spite of significant levels of investment in defenses such as firewalls and anti-virus and anti-spam products. Dealing with these attacks cost U.S. businesses over $67 billion last year. To make things worse, malware designers are staying slightly ahead of the game with a visible trend emerging of malware becoming stealthier and much harder to detect. Successfully mitigating security threats requires a multi-pronged approach that must include mechanisms that address different levels of the enterprise. Today's enterprise networks are very complex because of the sheer number of heterogeneous enforcement points (involving multiple product lines from multiple vendors), the mobility of endpoints, and most importantly, the scale of the network itself (typical enterprise networks contain hundreds of thousands of hosts). Given these challenges, protecting the enterprise is a significant task, and relatively little work has been done in this area up to this point. In fact, enterprise policy management today is still largely a manual, ad-hoc process, lacking useful higher-level abstractions and a systems-level view in the application of security policies. In essence, there is very little autonomics today in the operational aspects of enterprise security management.
INTRODUCTION
Among the list of challenges faced by IT departments, security consistently ranks as one of the top year after year as reported by the Gartner Group. Firewalls, anti-virus software, and other similar protection mechanisms are ubiquitous in corporate networks. In spite of this, there is little respite from the spate of worm attacks, viral infections, host compromises, spyware, etc. It is estimated that protecting against these threats costs businesses about $67 billion a year, in the U.S. alone [8] .
Among the myriad security threats that are seen today, worms and other kinds of self-propagating malware are, anecdotally at least, the single most challenging problem that the Internet faces. The homogeneous makeup of the Internet makes it very vulnerable to these kinds of attacks while its rich connectivity makes it very easy for worms to propagate. Thus far, state-of-the-art Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have made use of the quickly spreading nature of these attacks to identify them with high sensitivity and at low false positive (FP) rates. However, in the race between worm designers and security vendors, the former always seem slightly ahead: there is a growing trend towards the use of stealthy worms that use evasion techniques to cloak their presence on an infected host. Such worms render existing IDSs ineffective. In addition, existing IDS products do not protect from day-zero exploits, which malware designers are adopting far more than in the past.
In this paper, we first describe host-level protection, i.e., self-defending platforms, that can defeat (or at least detect) attacks that attempt to subvert the Operating System (OS). This is done using a runtime integrity service that automatically improves the security and robustness of networked platforms by leaving no place for malware to hide. We then describe distributed detection and inference, a method whereby protected systems can collaborate (or "gossip") to detect (and signal) networkscale attacks (or infections). Untrusted systems cannot benefit from such gossip protocols as this network-wide information is secured by protecting the software on the end-point. Finally, we describe the adaptive feedback framework, a framework in which the "network state" as determined by the distributed detection can trigger feedback mechanisms to mount an automated response to day-zero threat conditions. The rationale for using network-wide information in our approach is also to enforce the autonomic response more intelligently, in a holistic manner, as compared to the more ad-hoc 'per device type' enforcement approach, and to target the most effective control points. 
SELF-DEFENDING PLATFORMS
Our approach to create a self-defending platform leverages Intel Virtualization Technology (commonly known as VT-x) to efficiently enforce memory protections, and Intel Active Management Technology (Intel AMT) [18] to enforce network policies on the endpoint. We provide a brief background on VT-x for the sake of completeness. Interested readers can find a detailed description of this technology in this specification [1] . In the rest of this section, we assume that the reader is familiar with IA-32 instruction set architecture, the details of which can be found in the referenced Intel specification [2] . Tables (APTs) . These page tables reference the real physical memory on the platform and are used by the processor for address translation. Each guest OS maintains its own page tables, called Guest Page Tables (GPTs) . The VMM synchronizes APTs with GPTs in software using an algorithm called the Virtual TLB (VTLB) algorithm. The VTLB algorithm behaves similar to a processor Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). The algorithm relies on the VMM's ability to trap events such as page faults and execution of certain instructions (for e.g., INVLPG, MOV CR3), that are used by a legacy OS to manage virtual memory. A detailed description of this algorithm is out of the scope of this paper, and interested readers are referred to [3] for further details.
SELF-DEFENDING PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE
We propose to build an autonomic platform with the following objectives:
• Enable programs to securely specify their in-memory structure and access policies to the platform, including interaction with verified shared libraries and shared components.
• After the program is recognized by the platform, detect changes to the program code/data.
• Prevent use violation, by bugs or malware, by enforcing code entry at well-known offsets.
• Prevent malware from root-kiting (invalidly hooking) critical services on the platform.
• Self-remediate the platform when an attack is detected.
Our architecture leverages privileges provided by VT-x to the VMM to monitor and protect software agents running inside a guest OS from other components of the same OS. This ensures that malware running in the guest OS is not able to tamper with critical software agents running in the same OS, even if the malware is able to achieve the highest privilege level within that OS. The VMM is measured at boot time as part of the measured boot sequence. Figure 2 shows the architectural overview. All the agents that need protection implement a data structure called the Integrity Manifest (IM). The IM is cryptographically signed by the vendor or another trusted source and it describes the structure of the agent when it is loaded into memory correctly. Other components of the architecture include the following:
• The Integrity Measurement Module (IMM) to use the IM to validate the agent in-memory. The IMM itself is part of an isolated secure partition in the platform such as a Service OS (VM).
• The Verification Registration Module (VRM) to provide hyper calls for (de)registration.
• The Memory Protection Module (MPM) to manage the page tables.
At a high level, the setup phase for self-defense of software agents proceeds as follows:
1. The guest OS loads the software agent into memory and starts executing it.
2. The agent (or 3 rd party) registers with the VRM and requests memory protections. As a part of this registration request, the agent provides its IM to the VRM.
3. The VRM forwards the unauthenticated request along with the Manifest to the IMM. The IMM validates the signature of the manifest belongs to a trusted vendor or other source using a certificate authority signing hierarchy. Integrity of the manifest is then verified using this signature to ensure it was not modified.
4. The IMM uses highest privilege memory accesses to read the agent in the host physical memory, and it validates that the agent has not been altered, by comparing the agent's loaded image with the IM's description of that image [7] . Table (PPT) for the agent code and data to protect the agent from runtime memory attacks. The MPM ensures this by removing the references to the agent's code and data from the APT used by the OS.
Once the setup described above is completed the MPM enforces various system policies such as preventing invalid jumps into the code and disallowing outside (nonagent code) read and/or write access into protected agent data. The MPM ensures that it can see all these events without risk of circumvention, due to the hardware virtualization capability of the processor. Specific events such as page faults cause transitions into the MPM that moderates these access attempts.
We have prototyped this architecture on an Intel VT-x based platform with Intel's lightweight VMM (LVMM) and used it to protect network drivers running in Windows XP * guest OSs.
STANDARDS FOR INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT
The purpose of integrity measurement is three-fold: 1) to locate the program in host physical memory, 2) to verify that the program has been loaded into the memory without any tampering, and 3) to ensure that the program executes correctly. In this architecture, we propose a standard structure to enable runtime in-memory verification of the software agent in the IM.
The IM data structure contains cryptographically verifiable information about each code and/or static data section of the binary program file that would be loaded to the memory. This includes cryptographic hashes [4] of the various sections that are to be verified. However, when the agents get loaded into memory, the OS performs relocation operations on these sections, in turn modifying the contents of these sections. Thus, to be able to verify the integrity of these sections at runtime, the IM includes information about locating and verifying these modifications were executed correctly. Specifically, the IM contains the following:
1. A cryptographic hash of the contents of each of the sections.
2. External symbols (functions or global data) that are referred to by the sections of interest.
3. Relocation entries that will be used by the OS to relocate the sections of interest (this enables the IMM to revert the relocation changes made by the OS, before the IMM computes the cryptographic hash for verification). [6] can benefit from such a standard to attest platform integrity to the network.
A list of allowed entry-points into the code (offset in a section
The combination of these standards with built-in platform integrity services allows for fully autonomic monitoring and verification of programs and their behavior at runtime. No user intervention is required to establish and maintain the proper execution of programs once protections have been enabled. Furthermore, the platform can automatically attest to the presence and status of the software executing on it to network access control mechanisms, report errors, or warn of possible attacks to trusted peers in the network, as we discuss next.
DISTRIBUTED DETECTION AND INFERENCE
As presented in the previous section, a secure platform is the best way to secure the enterprise, but it may take a long time for enterprises to upgrade all end systems. Therefore it is still important to have a reliable detection system throughout the enterprise. In this section, we describe a framework to combat the increasingly urgent problem of intrusion attempts within an enterprise. Traditional defenses have relied on perimeter mechanisms such as firewalls to protect the inside of an enterprise from external threats. However, the modern enterprise has very loosely defined boundaries and hosts are generally free to move in and out. Once infected hosts return into the enterprise, the infecting malware is free to spread relatively unchecked. Conventional detection schemes are based on observing traffic entering and leaving aggregation points around the enterprise. These schemes, while moderately successful, have several limitations, the most severe of which is that they are not very good at detecting slowly spreading worms that try to blend in with normal background traffic. The counter-measure that is often used for this type of worm is to use a variety of sensors around the network that measure and track different traffic features and that correlate one piece of information with another piece of information. Our framework extends this idea to the logical extreme: we consider each end-host in the enterprise to be a potential sensor (or Local Detector) and we allow the end-hosts to exchange information and corroborate the state of the network, i.e., whether it is infected or not. As we will show, such a system is able to detect slowly spreading network anomalies at a very low FP rate (which is much lower than those associated with conventional methods and tools). Briefly, there are several intuitive ideas for a collaborative, host-based framework:
1. IDSs deployed selectively might not see any worm traffic for a long time and perhaps see it only when it is too late. Collaboration is seen as a way to remedy this; systems that allow multiple IDSs to share information have been shown to provide greater "coverage" in detection [9, 10, 11, and 12 ].
2. Analysis of network traffic at the host level allows the weak signal to be compared to a much smaller background noise-level, so the signal-to-noise ratio can be boosted by orders of magnitude compared to an IDS that operates within the network.
3. Host-based detectors can make use of a richer set of data, possibly using application data from the host as input into the local classifier.
The detection and inference framework we describe here is quite simple: end-hosts contain Local Detectors (LDs) that are meant to detect anomalous behavior at the endhost. This could be by means of system integrity checks, watching outgoing network traffic, looking for anomalous behavior, etc. Periodically, the LDs gossip their local state (whether an anomaly was detected in some preceding window, or not) to other hosts. Some (or perhaps all) of the nodes in the network also contain Global Detectors (GDs). Their function is to aggregate the signals received from LDs (each GD receives signals from some number of LDs in the network). Thus, each GD computes the probability that a network-wide anomaly is occurring.
In the rest of this section, we describe the LDs that we use and describe how information from different LDs is combined into a single measure. Subsequently, we describe simulation results that compare the performance of different models.
Local Detectors
Simply put, an LD (end-host-based detector) is any entity that generates an output signal, taking as input the state of the end-host. For our specific purpose, the LD simply generates a Boolean signal that is true if an "anomaly" is detected, and false otherwise. We also assume that the LDs are weak in the sense that they may have a high FP rate, and are non-specific, so are likely to fire for a broad range of anomalous behavior. The LD implementation that we use in our proof of concept is quite simple: it counts the number of new "network connections" that are initiated by the host in a certain time window. If this count exceeds a pre-defined threshold, it assumes an anomaly exists. In Figure 3 , we show the distribution of the number of new connections initiated by a host in a 50s interval. The plot corresponds to network traces collected at 37 hosts in the Intel corporate network over a five-week period. Also shown in Figure 2 are the average rates for a number of known worms (MS Blaster, Slapper, Code Red II, etc.). Clearly, these propagate at a rate that is quite high and clearly stand out in the distribution. Thus, using a very high threshold for our LD (about 200 connections per 50s) would be sufficient to detect the said worms accurately and without many FPs. However, the trend that has been recently observed is that worms are getting slower and slower, moving to the left side of the distribution. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our system to detect slow worms, and at a low FP rate, we push the LD threshold down by orders of magnitude and set it to 4 connections per 50s interval. Note in Figure 2 , this number is well within the bulk of the normal traffic distribution. If an individual LD was used by itself, and at this threshold, it would have generated thousands of false alarms over the five-week period; however, it would have successfully detected worms operating at a much slower rate. Thus, a simple way to create a weak, non-specific LD is to drastically reduce the threshold of some standard heuristic, although other standard anomaly detection techniques can be used as well.
The alarms raised by individual LDs in our system are "gossiped" to other peer hosts. Thus, LDs periodically share their "belief" with other nodes in the network. Conceptually, we could think of end-hosts containing an LD (which operates as above) and also a GD which simply aggregates the information received from different LDs, based on some model to compute a network-wide belief. In the following section, we briefly discuss a few models that do this.
A valid concern is how might such a system protect the computing environment against the malicious corruption of the LDs or the GDs. One approach would be to adopt integrity services on the subset of nodes running the distributed detection algorithms-the number of nodes required is substantially fewer than the entire enterprise. An alternate approach, besides the adoption of integrity services, is to place the LD and GD functionality in protected hardware, rather than in more vulnerable software. Work is underway to study other vulnerabilities, e.g., how to make the system robust to some number of rogue LDs sending misinformation to GDs and thereby skewing the analysis completely.
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Global Detectors
There are potentially several models that allow combining of the local beliefs, received from individual LDs, into some "global" belief. The simplest possible way would be to count the number of positive firings and threshold this value (that is, use the PosCount model). Another potential model is the CuSum detector, well known in the area of statistical process control, which is used to detect deviations from some mean (over a statistic of interest). However, a drawback with these simpler models is that they do not really support heterogeneous LDs, i.e., detectors of varying "quality." In contrast to these baseline techniques, models based on Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) [13] overcome this shortcoming by taking into account the FP and True Positive (TP) rates of individual detectors in a systematic manner. Essentially, DBNs are a principled formalism for expressing independence relations while modeling temporal (stochastic) processes.
In our work, we explore two DBN instances, namely the Change-Point DBN and the Epidemic DBN. The former assumes that up to some time, t cp ,, the network as a whole is not in an anomalous state; whereas after t cp the network is. In contrast, the latter models the spread of exponentially growing signals (anomalies, in our specific context) in a system. Clearly, each of these models is well suited to specific applications. For instance, if a system were to use high quality LDs (very low FP rate and very high TP rate), then presumably, the PosCount model would perform quite well (and has the advantage of low computational overhead). In the next section, we compare the performance of our system assuming very general (but weak) LDs.
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SIMULATION STUDIES
Here we present a set of results that highlight the advantages of the system we are proposing. Results are based on data collected from a set of 37 machines over a five-week period. The specific LDs used were as described previously (the heuristic used is the number of distinct connections initiated in a 50-second window; an alarm is raised if this value is more than 4). On top of the actual traffic traces that we replayed, we super-imposed worm traffic that was generated according to an underlying distribution parameterized by the worm spread rate S, which is the number of attempted infections per worm per unit time, and the address density of the network that the worm is infecting. The results shown here use an S=1/20 cps and an address density of 1/1000. In other words, a worm will generate a new infection attempt every 20 seconds, which has a 1/1000 chance of reaching a valid (one capable of being infected) destination. Also, the LDs in the simulation had an epoch of 10 seconds, i.e., each LD, every 10 seconds, picks a node at random and shares its belief (on or off) with it.
All of the GD models that we explored (except for the PosCount model) required estimates of the true and FP rates of individual LDs. To make the comparison fair, we used the same parameters across all the LDs (DBNs account for the TP/FP rates in a principled fashion and, presumably, would do better than the other detectors if heterogeneous detectors were used). ‡ ‡ A TP rate of 0.6 and a FP rate of 0.2 were used for the simulations, the results of which are presented here.
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In the next section, we describe how such a detection framework can trigger a containment response from control points deployed in the enterprise.
ADAPTIVE FEEDBACK
With policy enforcement points such as those that reside on trusted, self-defending platforms, and intelligent intrusion detection systems as discussed above, it is important to have an overarching architecture that correlates distributed information, local decisions, and individual device actions so that we have a closed-loop for autonomic management. In this section we discuss the management building block of security autonomics for the enterprise-the adaptive policy management architecture. As shown in Figure 5 , the main components of this adaptive, self-management architecture include a Manager of Managers (MOM), Intermediate Device Managers (IDM), a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), and a Policy Feedback Point (PFP). The role of the MOM is to provide autonomic and centralized management of enterprise security policies, including translating business-driven policies into device-specific controls and pushing them to specific devices through IDMs. A main distinction of this architecture from the standard policy-based network management architecture [15] is the introduction of PFP and the control feedback loop. The PFP collects and processes intrusions, security alerts, violations, and other abnormal behaviors from a variety of systems (e.g., intrusion detection systems, system logs, etc.), and it sends such data as control feedback to the MOM. With such feedback information the MOM then determines the necessary control updates, which can either lead to automatic actions pushed to the network, or the feedback data and recommended actions can also be used to help the network administrator make corresponding human decisions on control updates.
The benefit of using the centralized MOM with adaptive feedback for automated response to a network condition is that it provides coverage for the entire network on a holistic level. This makes the autonomic response more intelligent than a "per security enforcement point" or even a "per security device type" detection and mitigation approach. These traditional per-device or per-device-type models, where each individual device only has knowledge of the local network events and will make a policy decision based on this limited information, has a potential to cause co-relation and conflicts, as there is no information sharing between the various enforcement points on the policies (both static and dynamic) and network events. Our approach ensures that all events are co-related and the action taken is applied at the most effective control point, which in our prototype example, was the network enforcement point closest to the source.
Since the MOM has the knowledge of the capabilities for each enforcement point, it is able to make an intelligent decision on the placement of these dynamic controls.
Figure 5: Conceptual architecture
Another distinguishing component of this architecture is the capability-based policy specification [14] , which enables high-level policies to be implemented transparently on end-devices and common policies to be pushed from a central location to various network devices from different vendors. Compared to most existing policy specification models [16] , our policy schema is a consistent and extensible data model for network security policy representation. The important notion of this schema is the ability to specify heterogeneous devices in terms of their capabilities. This approach allows the overall data model to be extensible, since newer devices can be added by describing their capability data models. This approach provides a platform that allows consistent security policy specifications and standard device capability specifications to be developed. Advantages of this policy specification include security policy specification independent of device differences, which allows for extensibility and algorithmic mapping; capability knowledge, which allows conflict resolution and threat analysis during security policy definition; data model that includes network and end-point nodes, which reduces the chances of lapses in security; a combined data model, which allows for co-related feedback events from the network and reduces the administrative (human) overhead of hand mapping a high-level security policy down to a heterogeneous set of devices, each with their own configuration methods and syntax.
Market Survey on Security Policy Management
We implemented a prototype of the above architecture with representative "real-world" operational enterprise IT use-cases to demonstrate the benefits of this architecture. We studied 15 commercial products/solutions from a broad variety of vendors, including the market leaders in network and security management, based on a survey by the Burton Group [17] . Based on our study we broadly categorized these products into three types: (1) vertical solutions with several desirable capabilities, but focused on single vendor devices and lacking support for management and integration in a multi-vendor enterprise environment; (2) multi-vendor network configuration and device management systems, most of which were designed for management, provisioning, automation for network configuration and Quality of Service (QoS), but not for security management; and (3) what we believe were the first-generation autonomic management solutions: these products have many of the required capabilities and can be evolved to cover for some of the missing capabilities necessary in today's enterprises. We selected two products from the third category for further operational validation against our use-cases, which are described in the following section.
ENTERPRISE USE CASES AND TEST RESULTS
We developed and tested our adaptive management architecture against several representative use cases to validate the architecture for a large enterprise network that consists of diverse security enforcement points with varying security capabilities, and to validate the usability of such architecture in highly complex, heterogeneous, multi-device, multi-protocol networks. The following are use cases most relevant to autonomic management:
• Degraded mode of operation. This use case is to demonstrate how a network policy reacts when the network is forced to move into a degraded mode of operation due to unexpected change (e.g., a denial of service attack).
• Dynamic policies with feedback from the network. The purpose of this use case is to demonstrate the ability to present real-time information driving adaptive change in the network configuration to secure against a threat detected by our distributed detection systems.
• Automatic detection, resolution, and verification of policy conflicts. Other related use cases we developed include complex policy enforcement, high-level policy definition and abstraction, domains of constant policies, and visualization. Figure 6 is a diagram of the lab network used to conduct the use case tests. The lab was set up so as to mirror a large-scale, heterogeneous IT production environment as close as possible. The setup includes typical network security products and technologies such as firewalls, network intrusion detection and prevention systems (NIDS/NIPS), routers, and switches. The network topology for the lab also mirrors a typical enterprise network with different zones (Internet, demilitarized zone <DMZ>, and Intranet). We used a Security Event Management System (SEMS) as the central repository of all network events. SEMS stores event streams from various sources such as IDSs, firewall logs, router logs, etc. in a database and performs a network-level holistic co-relation and aggregation of the events to generate realtime alerts for the entire network versus the per-device approach. These network-wide co-related alerts are used to trigger a policy update via the MOM to the appropriate network control point(s). In our tests, we were able to demonstrate the adaptive feedback concept using these active components. To simulate a network degradation, we injected a stream of abnormal network traffic using (denial-of-service-like) UDP-based malware attacks. The SEMS was able to detect these events, co-relate them, and send the alert to the MOM console. In response to this event, the MOM console automatically created the dynamic policy update as a response to the threat. In this example, the control update was to block the source IP address that was generating the attack traffic; this update was pushed to the network enforcement point closest to the source of the attack. We successfully verified this with multiple scenarios where the attack traffic was blocked automatically.
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CONCLUSION
Today's enterprise networks are extremely complex entities, containing a very large number of hosts and spread over many locations. Intrusion attempts due to selfpropagating code are becoming an increasingly urgent problem, in part due to the homogeneous makeup of the Internet. Recent advances in anomaly-based IDSs have made use of the quickly spreading nature of these attacks to identify them with high sensitivity and at low FP rates. However, slowly propagating attacks are much more difficult to detect because they are cloaked under the veil of normal network traffic, yet can be just as dangerous due to their exponential spread pattern. We describe a framework where hosts running local IDS instances can corroborate the likelihood of an attack in an autonomous, decentralized fashion, by gossiping their local beliefs to other participating hosts. Securing such a network and ensuring the correct operation of its component elements is an extremely challenging task. A large part of the complexity lies in the sheer heterogeneity of enforcement points, each of which must be configured and managed in slightly different ways. The state of the art is quite lacking: enterprise policy management is still largely a manual, localized process, lacking a higher level, networkwide view. There is an urgent need for a framework to unify the disparate components to allow for a more autonomic operation and maintenance of the network.
In this paper, we described three building blocks that move us closer to realizing the ultimate goal, that of "autonomic operation" of the enterprise. First, we described the notion of self defending platforms, which enable an end-host to detect program-level anomalies and unauthorized modifications. Next, we described the concept of distributed detection and inference, where endhosts collaborate among themselves to reason about the state of the entire network. Finally, we discussed an adaptive policy management architecture that can supplement the previously discussed capabilities. At a high level, the policy framework can support and complement the other two building blocks. It can do this by providing a channel for anomalies signaled by these building blocks to percolate up to entities that have a system-wide view of the network and to translate remedial actions determined at the system level into actionable tasks at the lower-level building blocks. That is, they can serve as a feedback channel from higher-level entities to the host-based mechanisms. To demonstrate the efficacy of our framework, we use the example of a DoS attack on a synthetic network and show how it can be stopped by means of our feedback mechanism.
